Introduction
This paper aims to give empirical evidence on the relationship between accounting policy choice and firm market value. Accounting policy is used by management as a signal tool to communicate different information about actual and future prospects of the firm to the market. The disclosed information is used by investors to make decisions about their future investments. However, what is communicated should have a certain amount of credibility and certainty because investors' decisions are highly sensitive to uncertainty.
Indeed, investors with higher uncertainty (risk) will require more compensation to bring their capital to the firm. As a consequence the firm value will be revised downward.
Accounting conservatism is considered to be the most widely used accounting policy in the last three decades and much empirical research has noted an increase in the degree of conservatism (Givoly and Hyan, 2000; Giner and Rees, 2001; Grambovas et al., 2006) . In addition, accounting conservatism is accepted as one of the most important attributes of financial reporting (Basu 1997; Watts 2003a; Francis et al, 2004) . However, despite this acceptance, the economic impact of conservatism is a subject of continuous debate between stander-setters and academicians.
Accounting literature defines conservatism, specifically, conditional conservatism, as "the accountant's tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses" (Basu, 1997, p. 7) . This interpretation leads to the assumption that earnings will reflect bad news more quickly than good news and this is called by Basu (1997) the asymmetric timeliness of earnings.
It is stated that the commitment to such accounting system can have an impact on firm value (Watts 2003a; Watts 2003b; Watts and Zuo, 2012) . In this paper we empirically test how conservatism can affect firm value through studying its impact on the cost of equity capital.
Based on prior analytical work, conditional conservatism is expected to affect the cost of equity capital mainly through two streams: (1) informational effects and (2) behavioral effects. The first stream supports the idea that accounting conservatism can have a signal role by increasing the investors' chances to assess private information held by managers (Bagnoli and Watts, 2005) . They argue that, in the presence of asymmetric information, accounting conservatism can be used as a tool to infer management's private information.
It is also demonstrated that conservative reporting enhances firm value and thereby reduce the cost of equity capital by mitigating information asymmetry between management and investors and increasing the precision of public and private information which will increase the readiness of investors to invest and subsequently reduces the cost of equity capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easly and O'Hara, 2004; Huges, Lui and Lui, 2007, Lambert, Leuz and Verecchiia, 2011) . On the other hand, recent analytical work has shown that accounting conservatism enhances overall information quality and increases the amount of information disclosed to the market (Fan and Zhang, 2010; Chen et al. 2007; Gao 2011; Nan and Wen 2011; Guay and Verrecchia 2007) .
From another point of view, it is shown that accounting conservatism acts as a substitute for voluntary disclosure. For example, Gietzman and Trombetta (2003) established settings in which firms adopting conservative reporting have a lower amount of disclosure, implying that accounting conservatism, as an accounting choice, substitutes for voluntary disclosure. This result suggests that if voluntary disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital, as is documented by much empirical research (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Easley and O'Hara, 2004; Francis et al, 2004; Botosan, 2006; Hail and Leuz 2007; Lambert et al, 2011) , the choice of a conservative accounting system can lead to the same results, that is reducing the cost of equity capital. In short, the reduction in the cost of equity capital is achieved because outside investors will interpret accounting conservatism as acting like voluntary disclosure in reducing asymmetric information and enhancing the credibility of information. Consequently, their risks will be revised downward which will decrease the amount of the required rate of return (cost of equity capital).
The second channel that links accounting conservatism to the cost of equity capital is behavioral effects. In fact, it has been shown that accounting conservatism reduces the cost of equity capital by reducing managerial opportunism (Watts 2003a; LaFond and Watts 2008; LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008) and constraining earnings manipulation (Chen, Hemmer, and. Zhang, 2007; Verrecchia, 2006, 2007) . For example, Chen et al. (2007) argue that "manipulation of earnings reduces accounting number's stewardship value and leads to inferior risk sharing and then shows that risk sharing can be improved under accounting conservatism". This coincides with the work of Suijs (2008) who demonstrated that the use of accounting conservatism systems leads to more efficient risk sharing between generations of risk averse investors and thus enhance firm value and reduces the cost of equity capital.
In a similar vein, Guay and Verrecchia (2007) formally proved that accounting conservatism, defined by imposing stricter verifiability to recognize good news than bad news will push managers to adopt strategic behavior resulting in full disclosure, reducing uncertainty about future firm's prospects and thereby reducing the discount applied by the market on the firm value. In brief, the commitment to an accounting conservatism system constrains managers' opportunistic behavior and earnings management and enhances firm value which may reduce the cost of equity capital. Much work has empirically tested this proposition and provides proof that accounting conservatism constrains earnings management and enhances firm value (Lara, Osma and Penalva, 2012; Kim et al. 2012; Ettredge et al. 2012b; Francis and Martin 2010; LaFond and Watts 2008; LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008) Our paper tries to empirically establish proof of a potential association between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital. Mainly we review five studies that examine the impact of accounting conservatism on the cost of equity capital. These works include Francis et al. (2004) , Chan et al. (2010) , Artiach and Clarkson (2010) , Garcia et al. (2011) and Biddle et al. (2012) . The findings of these studies are mixed. For example Francis et al (2004) found an insignificant association between conservatism and cost of equity capital. Chan et al. (2010) and Biddle et al. (2012) reported a significant positive association; however Artiach and Clarkson (2010) and Garcia et al. (2011) provided evidence of negative association. Such a discrepancy between the cited papers can be attributed to the use of different conservatism measures. Indeed, these studies have used different proxies of accounting conservatism which may result in different empirical findings. In addition, only the work of Garcia et al. (2011) used a firm-specific conservatism measure introduced by Callen et al. (2010) who argued that the proposed measure best reflects the degree of conservatism. However, the other studies used conservatism measures that have been criticized in accounting literature because of their induced bias.
All prior studies cited above have empirically examined the association between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital using data from developed markets. But, no previous study has analyzed this association in emerging markets, especially in MENA countries.
Using a sample of firms in 13 MENA countries for the period 2004-2007, we first check if accounting conservatism exists. To do so, we use the Basu (1997) model which is still the most widely used model to assess the existence of conservatism (Wang et al., 2009 ).
Secondly, we seek insights into the relationship between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital. The firm specific measure of conservatism is derived using Khan and Watts' (2009) approach and we apply Estrada's (2000) model to infer the cost of equity capital estimates at firm level. Our empirical results collectively indicate that firms in MENA countries produce conservative financial reports and there is a significant negative association between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital of the firm after controlling for risk factors. Thirdly, using Khan and Watts' (2009) model, we construct proxies for the two mechanisms of conditional conservatism, that is, conservatism with regard to bad news recognition and conservatism with regard to good news recognition. We find that the two mechanisms are negatively associated with the cost of equity capital.
Our research paper contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. First, all prior studies examining the relation between accounting conservatism and cost of equity capital were done using data from developed countries. This study, to our knowledge, provides the first empirical evidence on the effect of accounting conservatism on cost of equity capital using data from emerging markets (cross-country study). In addition our study is the first one which uses the Khan and Watts (2009) measure of conservatism at firm level in an empirical test. Second, we also explore the association between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital by considering the two mechanisms of conditional conservatism separately, that is the timeliness of bad news and good news. Our findings give additional arguments for the beneficial effect of accounting conservatism to standard-setters (FASB and IASB) who still question the economic role of conservatism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews prior research and develops our hypotheses; Section 3 presents our research design including sample selection, descriptive analysis, empirical models and variable measures; Results are discussed in Section 4, followed by conclusions in Section 5.
Related literature and hypothesis development:
Accounting conservatism is considered to be one of the most important attribute of financial statement reporting. It has been noted in many empirical studies that accounting practices are not only conservative but they have become more and more conservative in the last three decades (Watts, 2003a, Givoly and Hyan, 2000; Giner and Rees, 2001; Grambovas et al., 2006) . Thus, it was legitimate that many studies have focused on looking into the economic impact of such accounting policies. This has become possible due to the work of Basu (1997) who gave a clear definition of accounting conservatism, specifically conditional conservatism. Indeed following Basu's(1997) definition, accounting conservatism is the differential verifiability requirements for recognizing good and bad news in financial reports, generating earnings that reflect bad news in a timelier way than good news. Prior works on accounting conservatism has focused on its contracting effects. Recently, research on accounting conservatism has focused on providing evidence of its economic impact and beneficial effects for equity markets. In particular, it has tried to show how accounting conservatism, as an accounting policy choice, can affect the firm market value. In this paper we empirically test the effect of accounting conservatism on the cost of equity capital as benchmark of the firm market value.
The association between conservatism and the cost of equity capital finds its root in many analytical works. We can regroup these studies according to two channels: (1) informational effects and (2) behavioral effects.
On one hand, it has been shown that accounting conservatism can play a signal role by forcing managers to disclose good news to overcome the bias problem induced by reporting bad news. Specifically, Bagnoli and Watts (2005) provided theoretical support that accounting conservatism can have information benefits. Using a game signal model, they argue that under asymmetric information, investors can infer managers' private information. Based on their model, the manager is supposed to have private information about the probability of whether the future prospects of the firm are good, and he cares about beating earnings expectations. They model a conservative accounting choice as a reporting policy that is better at identifying bad news than good news. According to them, the probability that the firm will report low earnings is greater if management adopts conservative accounting choices. Bagnoli and Watts (2005) In the same vein, it has also been demonstrated that accounting conservatism can reduce the information asymmetry between inside and outside investors and increase the precision of public and private information which in turn will reduce the investors' required rate of return and subsequently reduces the cost of equity capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easly and O'Hara, 2004; Huges, Lui and Lui, 2007, Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2011) 1 .
From another point of view, Gietzman and Trombetta (2003) established a theoretical model in which they show that a commitment to a system of accounting conservatism can substitute for voluntary disclosure. This result suggests that if voluntary disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital, as is documented by much empirical research (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Easley and O'Hara, 2004; Francis et al, 2004; Botosan, 2006; Hail and Leuz 2007; Lambert et al, 2011) , then accounting conservatism can be viewed as acting like voluntary disclosure to reduce the cost of equity capital.
The second stream of research supports the idea that accounting conservatism can constrain the opportunistic behavior of managers (Watts 2003a; Watts 2003b; Lafond and Watts, 2008; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008) and mitigates earnings management (Chen, Hemmer, and. Zhang, 2007; Verrecchia, 2006, 2007) . In fact, accounting conservatism will impose more verification to recognize good news which can limit the ability of managers to manipulate firm's performances. In turn, the firm market value will be enhanced.
In a similar vein, Guay and Verrecchia (2007) formally proved that accounting conservatism by imposing stricter verifiability to recognize good news than bad news will push managers to adopt strategic behavior resulting in full disclosure, reducing uncertainty about future firm prospects and thereby reducing the discount applied by the market on the firm value. In brief, the commitment to a system of accounting conservatism constrains managers' opportunistic behavior and earnings management and enhances firm value, which may reduce the cost of equity capital. Many works have empirically tested this proposition and provide proof that accounting conservatism constrains earnings management and enhances firm value (Lara, Osma and Penalva, 2012;
LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008).
From an empirical point of view, we review five prior studies that test the effect of accounting conservatism on cost of equity capital. The first one was initiated by Francis et al. (2004) The few empirical examples of the existence of accounting conservatism's effect on the cost of equity capital offer mixed evidence. Some support the theoretical findings that sustain that accounting conservatism can play a signaling role by conveying more information to the market, and thus reducing uncertainty and risk born by investors and lowering the costs of equity capital. The others, however, contradict this theory by arguing that conditional conservatism can prompt managers to behave opportunistically and disclose good information in a timely way, and thus cause financial reports to be less informative, leading to an increase in cost of equity capital.
In this paper we lay emphasis on the beneficial effect of accounting conservatism by examining the association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity capital.
Prior studies have used data from developed countries to test this association; however, no previous studies have been done in an emerging market context. Thus we try to seek insights into the effect of conditional conservatism on the cost of equity capital using data from emerging economies, especially from MENA countries.
The theoretical literatures reviewed above identify that the association between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital can be viewed as an indirect relationship. First, accounting conservatism may have signaling benefits since it can be used as an accounting policy choice to communicate management's private information (Bagnoli and Watts, 2005) leading to the reduction of information asymmetry and information with higher quality (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) . Second, the theory predicts that a higher level of disclosed information can reduce the cost of equity capital by reducing uncertainty, risks and estimation risk.
We depart from both the economic and signaling theories; we argue that there is a negative relation between conservatism and cost of equity capital. Formally, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Firms with a higher degree of conservatism have a lower cost of equity capital.
The first hypothesis tests the economic consequence of conditional conservatism viewed as a global mechanism. However, Conditional conservatism refers to the manifestation of conservatism as the asymmetry in response of earnings to good and bad news (Basu, 1997) .
In other words, conditional conservatism can be viewed as the combination of two mechanisms that are conditional conservatism with regard to bad news recognition and to good news recognition. Our second and third hypotheses are:
H2: Conditional conservatism with regard to bad news recognition has a negative effect on the cost of equity capital.
H3:
Conditional conservatism with regard to good news recognition has a negative effect on the cost of equity capital.
Data, descriptive statistics and research design 3.1 Sample selection and description
Data are collected from companies followed by S&P and included in their S&P/IFC emerging markets indices. While the FTSE institutional shareholder services (ISS) and CLSA focus on, respectively, developed markets and Asian emerging markets, S&P covers many more countries including MENA emerging markets. In our sample, all MENA companies must be domiciled in an emerging market (S&P/IFCG) or a lesser developed global frontier market (S&P/IFCG frontier) and be among the most actively traded securities in the market.
The preliminary sample includes all firms from 13 MENA countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) for the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . This provides an initial sample of 7,120 firm-year observations. After eliminating missing data and deleting firms in the top and bottom 1% of the variable in our models. The final set of data contains 1,287 firm-year observations. Unfortunately, it is difficult to directly compare descriptive statistics with prior studies, given that conservatism was calculated in different ways. For example, Givoly and Hayn (2000) who use the accumulation of negative no-operating accruals method, find a mean of -0.047
and a median of -0.037. However, Khan and Watts (2009) 
Testing the existence of conservatism in MENA countries
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of accounting conservatism on cost of equity capital using data from emerging markets. But, a main question arising in this study is: Do firms in MENA countries practice accounting conservatism? That is, we need first to have evidence that conservatism exists in MENA economies. To do so, we use the Basu (1997) model.
Recall that the foundation underlying the Basu (1997) measure is that earnings will reflect bad news more quickly than good news. In support, Basu (1997) argues that accountants have a tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news and offers as an example the fact that unrealized losses are typically recognized earlier than unrealized gains.
He then argues that, "This asymmetry in recognition leads to systematic differences between bad news and good news periods in the timeliness and persistence of earnings", and thus, the degree of asymmetric timeliness between the recognition of bad and good news represents a measure of conservatism. On this basis, the model developed by Basu (1997) to measure the existence of conservatism is:
( 1) where EPS is earnings per share, P is opening stock price, R is market return and DR is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the market return is negative (bad news) and 0 if the market return is non-negative (good news). Within this model, relates the degree to which new good news was impounded in accounting earnings. Likewise, the degree to which bad news available to the market was impounded in earnings is measured by where is the incremental responsiveness of earnings to bad news, and thereby represents a measure of the extent of asymmetric timeliness. In the presence of conservatism, is expected to be positive and the ratio greater than 1.
Conditional conservatism and the cost of equity capital
We use the following model to test the association between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital controlling for other risk factors. This model is developed based on previous studies on the same issue (Chan et al 2009 , Garcia et al. 2011 , Artiach and Clarkson, 2010 
Where: is the estimated cost of equity capital of firm i in year t measured following the Estrada (2000) approach. is firm's capital asset pricing model (CAPM) beta in year t.
is the book-to-market value of equity ratio. s the natural log of the market value of equity measured at the end of the year. CONSERV is a firm specific measure of conditional conservatism obtained using the Khan and Watts (2009) method.
Based on our first prediction, we expect the coefficient on CONSERV variable to be negative ( . Note that, the choice of control variables (BETA, SIZE and BTM) included in the model (7) is guided by prior literature, notably Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Francis et al. (2004) . These factors are commonly known as the three risk proxies that can have an effect on the cost of equity capital French, 1992, 1993) .
To test the effect of the two mechanisms of conditional conservatism, that is BNEWS and GNEWS, we use respectively the two following models:
Where is the estimated cost of equity capital of firm i in year t measured following the Estrada (2000) approach. BETA, BTM and SIZE are the risk factors as described above.
BNEWS is the conservatism measure with regard to bad news recognition and GNEWS is a measure of conditional conservatism with regard to good news recognition. BNEWS and GNEWS are firm-specific measures and obtained using Khan and Watts' (2009) method.
According to our predictions, we expect that the coefficients and will be negative.
Conservatism measures and cost of equity capital estimates

A. Conditional conservatism measures
Over the last decade, research on accounting conservatism focused on a readable way in which conditional conservatism can be measured. To address this issue, many proxies have 
Where i indexes the firm, EAR is earnings, R is returns (measuring news), D is a dummy variable equal to 1 when R > 0 and equal to 0 otherwise, and is the residual.
According to Basu (1997) , the coefficient represents the good news timeliness and the incremental timeliness for bad news over good news, conservatism, is and the total bad news timeliness is .
In order to obtain a firm-year measure of conservatism, Khan and Watts (2009) specify that (referred to as G-score) and (referred to as C-score) are linear functions of firm-specific characteristics each year as follows:
Where MTB is the market-to-book ratio calculated as market value of equity (market capitalization) divided by book value of equity (equity capital). LEV is leverage defined as long-term and short-term debt deflated by market value of equity. SIZE is the natural log of market value of equity.
Empirical estimators of and (i=0,…,4) are constant across firms but vary over time. Cscore and G-score vary across firms through cross-sectional variation in the firm-year characteristics (SIZE, LEV and MTB). To estimate the coefficient within equation (6) and (7), Khan and Watts (2009) 
use the following annual cross-section regression model:
This equation results from substitution of equation (6) and (7) into equation (5) including additional terms in the last parentheses. After estimating this model, the C-score and G-score for each firm in each year is obtained as:
These values are specific to each firm in each year, since the characteristics SIZE, BTM and LEV vary across firms and years. The estimation results of the Khan and Watts model are reported in Table 2 . The coefficients in bold are those used to compute the G-score and Cscore.
To estimate the value of the two mechanisms of conditional conservatism that is conditional conservatism with regard to bad news recognition (BNEWS) and conservatism with regard to good news recognition (GNEWS), we use the same procedure of Khan and Watts (2009) as described above. We take the value of equations (8) as a measure of the variable GNEWS and the sum of equation (8) and (9) as a measure of BNEWS.
B. Cost of equity capital estimate
The most commonly used method to estimate the cost of equity capital is based on CAPM models. This method is widely used in the context of developed countries but it is criticized when applied in an emerging markets framework. Harvey (1995) and Estrada (2000) argue that the problem behind the use of the classical CAPM model lies in the estimation of systematic risk or market risk. The Classical CAPM supposes that markets are totally efficient to use beta risk in estimating cost of equity capital. However, emerging markets do not have this characteristic. They are rather considered as semi-integrated markets. To estimate the cost of equity for companies in emerging markets, Estrada (2000 Estrada ( , 2002 Estrada ( , 2004 Estrada ( , 2007 proposes a new method based on the downside risk approach. Generally, the model is as follows:
Where COC is the cost of equity of the firm i, is free risk rate of global market (US market), is the risk measure of firm i and is the premium risk of the global market. Where R is the monthly return of the firm, ̅ is the annual average return, is the market return and ̅ is the annual average market return.
Finally, the cost of equity capital can be obtained following the Estrada approach as:
Results and discussion
Results of Basu (1997) model estimations
The first test made in our study is to provide evidence for the existence of accounting conservatism in our sample (MENA firms). To do so, as indicated in Section 3, we will use the well-known Basu (1997) model. According to Basu (1997) , the model given by equation
(1) should be estimated either in industry-year using a cross-section of firms or for a firm using a time-series of firm-years. Following the same idea, we estimate the Basu (1997) model in two ways: first by year using a cross-section OLS regression and all firms in all countries, and second by country using panel data. ( Table 4 here)
In conclusion, by using the Basu (1997) model, we have provided evidence that accounting conservatism exists in MENA countries. Table 5 , all risk factors BETA, SIZE, BTM are correlated with cost of equity variable as indicated in Fama and French (1993) . For example, the SIZE is negatively associated with the cost of equity, suggesting that large firms have a lower cost of equity capital since they are more diversified and bear fewer risks. However, the variables BETA and BTM are positively correlated with the COC variable, indicating that firms with higher systematic risk have a greater cost of equity capital.
The Relation between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital
We remark also that the conservatism variable is negatively associated with the cost of equity capital. However this association is low (-0.152) suggesting that this relationship cannot be linear. Note also that the three determinant factors, SIZE, MTB and LEV are negatively associated with conditional conservatism. In fact, Khan and Watts (2009) argued that firms with large size have to be less conservative. In addition, Francis et al. (2004) and Chan et al. (2010) provide that unconditional conservatism traditionally measured by MTB ratio is negatively associated with conditional conservatism.
(TABLE 5 here)
Our first hypothesis predicts that conditional conservatism negatively affects the cost of equity capital. In order to test this hypothesis we use the econometric model given above by equation (2) which is estimated in three ways. The model was first estimated using the entire sample data. Second it was assessed by year and finally by country. Table 6 gives the estimation results of model (2). These estimations are obtained using the entire sample, i.e. all firms in all countries at all years. Under this specification, a generalized linear panel model is used to make estimates. All reported p-values are two-tailed. As shown in Table 6 , the coefficient on conservatism reflects the strength of any linear relationship between cost of equity capital and conditional conservatism. The coefficient, as predicted, is negative (-0.493) and significant with a p-value of 0.000. Thereby, indicating support of our prediction that conditional conservatism reduces the firm's cost of equity capital. The results for the control variables indicate, as expected, that the coefficients on BETA and BTM are positive and significant while the coefficient on SIZE is negative and significant.
Pooled sample regression results
(TABLE 6 here) Table 7 presents the coefficient values, re-estimating our econometric model in equation (2) using OLS for each of the four years in our sample period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) Kunter (1983) , the VIF indicates a problem of multicollinearity if the factor exceeds 10. Thus, mutlicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in our model for each year. Table 7 
Annual Regressions
Regression results by country
We test again our first prediction using the same econometric model given in equation (2) but estimations are made for each country of our sample. Morocco and Turkey present a negative and significant coefficient of the variable CONSERV, which provides evidence supporting our prediction for those countries. Note also that the control variables present the predicted sign and are in general significant at different levels.
The second group of countries (Panel B) also presents mixed results and only Jordan has a coefficient of the CONSERV variable which is negative and significant at the level of 1%.
The relation between BNEWS and cost of equity capital
Our second prediction states that quickly recognition of bad news (BNWES) is negatively associated with cost of equity capital. To test this hypothesis we use the model given by equation (3) where the variable CONSERV in model (2) is replaced by the variable BNEWS which represents the measure of timeliness of bad news recognition. It is obtained by the sum of the G-score and C-score computed from the estimation of the Khan and Watts (2009) model as mentioned above. Table 9 reports the estimation results of the model (3). As predicted, the coefficient on the variable BNEWS is negative (-0.955) with a p-value of 0.005.
This supports our hypothesis. The control variables BETA, BTM, and SIZE have coefficients with the predicted sign and are all statistically significant. Also, overall the model is significant (Chi² Wald test=197.62 with p-value of 0.000).
(TABLE 9 here) Table 10 reports the estimation of the model in equation (4). Recall that H3 predict that conditional conservatism with regard to the delayed recognition of good news (GNEWS), which is obtained by the computation of the G-score under the Khan and Watts (2009) 
The relation between GNEWS and cost of equity capital
negatively affects the cost of equity capital. As predicted, Table 10 shows that the coefficient of the variable GNEWS is negative (-0.913) and significant at the level of 1%. (TABLE 10 here)
The final results provide evidence that conditional conservatism, as the sum of two different mechanisms, the quickly recognition of bad news and the delayed recognition of good news negatively affects the cost of equity capital.
Summary and conclusion
In this study, we seek insights into the economic consequences of accounting conservatism by examining the relationship between conservatism and cost of equity capital. Based on both the analytical and empirical literatures, we posit a negative association. We based our analysis on a sample of 1,287 firm-year observations over the four-year period 2004-2007 collected on companies belonging to MENA countries. In our analysis we use the Khan and Watts (2009) model to estimate the firm-year level of conditional conservatism. This method is based on the well-known Basu (1997) model which is still widely used in the literature as a measure of conditional conservatism despite its empirical drawbacks. The cost of equity capital is estimated based on the work of Estrada (2000) . He provides a modified way to compute the cost of equity capital in the context of emerging markets based on downside risk. Our main hypothesis proposes a negative association between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital. Before testing this hypothesis, we tested the presence of accounting conservatism in MENA countries. Overall, results show that companies from MENA countries have conservative financial reports. This was obtained by the use of the Basu (1997) model which was estimated by year during the period 2004-2007 and for the entire sample.
The estimation results of our main hypothesis support the idea that conditional conservatism negatively affects the cost of equity capital of the firm.
We argue that this study has the potential to make a contribution from the perspective of both the regulator and the academic literature. From a regulatory perspective, we interpret the findings as indicative that a firm's decision to adopt conservative reporting practices has the potential to provide real economic benefits, and thereby that accounting conservatism has a potentially beneficial role within accounting principles and practices. In terms of the academic literature, it contributes to the growing body of literature on accounting policy choice which focuses on economic benefits of accounting policy decisions like adopting conservative reports, especially for emerging markets.
In sum, we view this study as making a contribution to academic research, regulators and industry by improving our understanding of the positive role and benefits of accounting conservatism mainly in emerging markets. The test of the presence of accounting conservatism that we have made will encourage researchers to further investigate its benefits.
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